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CITAPr.1 'T I
Causes Leading to the Inrei t ion of the Conmnercial Clause
In the Conrtitulion.
When the American Colonies threw off the British yoke
and became "free and independent states, the power to reg-
ulate intercourse with foreign nations and with each
other vested in thc Several 13tates. They were not di-
vested of this power by the adoption of the Articles of
Confederation for this agreement simply forme7 a league
I
of the Several Statea, whose ambassadors met in an as-
sembly called the Continental Congress, to discuss and
recommend measures for the common wxelfare. This body
could make treaties but it could not enforce them and it
was given no power enabling it to control commercial re-
lations, whether internal or external.
The Articles of Confederation served the purposes of the
United States as long as the American reople were beset by
a foe from without and must of necessity unite every effort
in this struggle for independence; but TJhen hostilities
ceased the need of a stronger central authority became
manifest. The common danger being absent the States no
longer strove for the "common cause.' Each sought its
interests even to the prejudice of its neighbors.
PA vexatious problem in each of the States was the raising
of revenue. A comparatively easy solution--the taxation
of all imports--was found by those States having good har-
bors; e. g., New York, Pennsylvania, and Thode Island:
but this bore heavily on the people of other States who
had to make use of those harbors. The inhabitants of
New Jersey situated between the harbors of New York City
and-Philadelphia were thus forced to unwillingly pay a large
proportion of the revenues going to support the Penn-
sylvania and New York governments. Connetticut situated
between New York City and Newport was similarly burdened.
Goods passing from one State to another were also heavily
taxed. In short each State sought as far as possible to
make the citizens of other States pay its own governmental
expenses. The burdens thereby imposed and the jealousies
aroused threatened the disruption of the Oonfeder:tion;
but Congress was powerless to interfere. Other causes
also tended to show the necessity of a stronger central
power but none were as efficacious as the prevalent com-
mercial distress.
Even before the adoption of the Articles of Confed-
eration New Jersey declared herself in favor of gi7ing Con-
3gress exclusive control o- coimnchrc,- in the following lan-
guage, viz,--"The sole and oxclusive power of reg ulating
the trade of the United States with foreign nations ought 4
be clearly vested in Congress" but the proposition did not
4;neet with favor. Commercial distress soon became gen-
eral and the leaders of the people began to realize that
something must be done. In 1781 we tind Alexander
Hamilton trying through The Continentalist .'to confirm an
opinion already pretty generally received, that it is nec-
essary to augment the power of the Confederation," adding
that nothing short of the power to regulate trade would
suffice. This thought runs through that wlole series of
papers, of which the last number is devoted to the "con-
sequences of not authorizing the Federal Government to reg-
ulate the trade of these States."
On Feb. 3, 1781 Congress took up the matter and rec-
ommended the States to -rest Congress with power to regulate
commerce, levy duties, etc; but Rhode Island. fearing to
lose her prestige refused to comply. Congress further urged
the necessity of increasing its control over commerce by
resolutions adopted on each of the following dates, viz;--
Apr. 30, 1784, July 13, 1785, Mar. 3, 1786, and Oct.23, 1786.
4New York h ad adopted resolutions on July 21, 178, point-
ihg out the want of power in the Federal Government and
recommending t1e "assembling a general convention of the
States, specially authorized to revise and amend the
Confederation" but nothing resulted. It remained for
Virginia to take the initial step which led to the Annapolis
Convention by a set of resolutions adopted Jan. 21, 1786,
appointing commissioners to "meet such commissioners as
may be appointed by other States--------------------------
to examine the relative situations and trade of the said
States; to consider how far an uniform system in their
commercial regulations may be necessarl! to their common
interests and their present harmony." Following Virginia's
lead several other States appointed commissioners who met
at Annapolis in Sept. 1786, tho convention having for its
object, as was declared In its address to the States, "the
trade and commerce of the United States." The delegates
being diversely instructed and all the States not being rep-
resented the Annapolis Convention adjourned recornmending'another
donvent on at Philadelphia AFin May f olloing' Mr.' utice
Miller, speaking .,w -ith reference to the origin of the Ann-
apolis Convention which lead to the adoption of the Con-
5stitution, once said;--"It is not a littlr remarkable that
the suggestion which finally led to the relieg without
which as a nation we must soon have perisherl, stron7ly
supports the philosophical maxim of modern times that of
all the agencies of civilization and progress, commerce
is the most efficient. W4hat our deranged finances, our
discreditable failure to pay our debts, and the sufferings
of our soldiers could not force the Several States to
attempt , was brought about by a desire to be release-
from the evils of an unregulated and burdensome com-
mercial intercourse."
Mhen the Philidelphia Convention met it drew up the
Constitution which was forthwith transmitted to the States
for their ratification. Much bitter discussion follov-
ed but nothing caused greater objections to the proposed
Constitution than the commercial clause, which reads as
follows, viz;--"The Congress shall have power to regulate
cormerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes." The advocates of
the Constitution boldly championed this grant of power
to Congress and some of the strongest papers in the
Federalist are on the benefits to be derived from an un-
6hampered commerce and the necessity of placing commercial
intercourse under federal control. In No. 12 of the
Federalist Hamilton says;- 2 A prosperous commerce is now
perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to
be the most useful, as well as the most productive, source
of national wealth; and has accorCingly become a primary
object of their political cares. By multiplying the means
of gratification, by promoting the introduction and cir-
culation of precious metals, those darling objects of hu-
man avarice and enterprise, it serves to vivify and in-
vigorate all the channels of industry and to make them
flow with greater activity and copiousness." In No. 22
the same writer sEays;-- "The want of a power to regulate
commerce, is by all parties allowed to be one of the dp-
fects of the existing federal system which concur in ren-
dering the system altogether unfit for the administration
of the affairs of the union------------------------------
It is indeed evident on the most superficial view, that
there is, no object either as It respects the interests of
trade or finance, thatmore, stronglyN demands a federal sup-
erintendance." In No's. 7 and 11 he writes in the same
strain as does also MaCison ir No. 4,. Although the Con-
'7
stitution i rCopltcO th rV Convntion in Sept. 1787, all
Of the States had not ratified it until Ma%, 1790, Rhode
Island being the last because of hei bitter opposition to
the commercial clause.
CKAP"IT II.
The Limitation Put upon the Power of tbe States.
Thus have I dwelt at considerable length upon one of
the principal causes leading tb the adoption of the con-
stitution and the reason for the insertion therein of the
commercial clause. Apparently tbis clause is clear--
*
the power to regulate international and inter-state com-
merce being vested in Congress; but notwithstanding this
apparently clear and distinct prohibition of interference
by the States, their attempted usurpations of the Congress-
ional Derogative have been many. The States Thave been
actuated by various purroses but usually by desires to ben-
efit their own citizens to t-.e disadvantage of the cit-
izens of other States. Statutes of varying import have been
enacted but even though so skillfully drawn that their
disguises were well nigh impenetrable, the courts havr gen-
erally succeeded in looking through them a'ad in ferreting
out attempted regulations of inter-state commerce. Pre-
quently have States attem-nted to lighten the burdens on
9their own citizens byraising revenue from taxes levied on-
interstate commerce. They have attempted to tax the com-
merce itself (State Freight Tax, 15 ial. 232; Henderson
v. The Mayor 92 U. S. 259; Crandall v. Nevada 6 Wall. 35;
Telegrarb Co. v. Texas 105 U. S. 46C4, the receipts from
interstate commerce (Fargo v. Michigan 121 U. S. 230;
Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 1,2 U. S. 326;
Western Union v. Alabama 132 U. S. 472, Patterman
v. Telegraph Co. 127 U. S. 411), and those engaged in
carrying on interstate commerce Picard v. Car Co., 117
U. S. 34; Robbins v. Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489;
Le Loup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S.
129; Mc Call v. Calafornia 136 U. S. 104; Crutcher v.
Kentucky, 141 U. S. 49 but they have failed in their
attempts.
While statesmen are trying because of economical, as
well as political, reasons to reduce the tax levies on tan-
gible property they are forced to seek new methods of rais-
ing revenue with which to meet the ever increasing de-
mands on the Ctate treasuries. Together with the increas-
ing tendency on the part of the State to tax intangibles,
thereby increasing the liability to inadvertantly tax
10
interstate commerce, has come a greater disposition* on the PFjrt
-of thoe t taxed to apply to the courts for relief from
taxes claiming the statutes to be unconstitutional attempts
to regulate interstate commerce. By the numerous de-
cisions handed down we fome to know more of the meaning of the
cmerciaclause -ut the law-makers also know more of its intri-
cacies and so skillfully do they draw the statutes that lay-
men are easily deceived and many usurpations of Congressionl
P~wer- pass unnoticed. Mr. Justice Miller speaking of the
commercial clause once said; "there are at this hour upon
the statute books of almost every State laws violating that
provision." (Miller on the Constitution p. 80.) Even
after much litigation and many learned expositions of the
law, extending from Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 iheat. 1, to State
of Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. 142 U. S. 217, there remains
great uncertainty as to Where the power of the State ceases
and ,where that of Congress begins. as to what is and what
is not a regulation Of commerce. Let us now consider a
few of the most important cases arising under this clause
of the Constitution; cases whfch show the interpretation
of this clause by our highest court cases which point out
the powers which were conferred upon Congress, and which in-
dicate to what extent the sovereign powers of the qtates
w're limited..
I Wr will- irst Gxemine ibbo s v. Ogden,',9
Wheat,. 1, which was decided ir 1824. The opinion of the
court was delivered by John Marshall whose lucid orinions
have done so much to enlighten us as to the proper inter-
pretation of the Constitution. The State of New York
granted to Livingston and Fultonfor a term of years) the
exclusive right to navigate all the waters within its
Jurisdiction with boats moved by steam or fire. A vessel
propelled by steam but registered under an act of Congress
regulating the licensing of vessels to engage in the
coasting trade souit to navigate waters within New York,
disregarding the exclusive rights granted by that State.
In the course of litigation arising therefrom the validity
of the New York statute was questioned. The United States
Supreme Court said that the power of Congress to regulate
commerce included the power to regulate navigation and that
the power did not stop at the external boundary of a State.
"This power like all others vested in Congress is complete
in itself and may be exercised to its utmost extent, ac-
knowledging no limitations other than are prescribed in
the Constitution." The New York statute was held to be
inoperative inasmuclis Congress had expressed its will by
passing the licensing statute but the court crcfully re-
frained from discusring the ciuestion whether the New, York
statute would have been roid if Congress had remainc' silent.
1",,hile Johnson, J., arreed with the court in its decision,
he based his opinicro'non broader grounds thinkin, that the
mere granting to Congress of this power to regulate cCrmxerce
had irso facto stripnoed the States of all authority over com-
merce. In the coursE of his opinion Chief justice M'arshall
said i,,ithout doubt the States might pass inspection laws,
quarantine laws, and health laws which may have a remote and
considerable influence on commerce but that such laws are a
part of that mass of legislation not surrendered to the gen-
eral gQvernment. "No direct general power over these ob-
jects is granted in Congress; and consequently, they re-
main subject to State legislation."
Three years later (in 1827) came Brown v. Maryland, re-
ported in 12 V1heat. at r. 436, which case involved the va-
liditv of c Marlan(7 f attc Icci -  .... to take
out a license snd pay a fee of fifty dollars before he should
be permitted to sell im-ported goods. The court held this
statute unconstitutional, being a prohibited regulation of
commerce. The Court -vaid, "i- cisttnction be-
tween a tax on the thing imported and
13
and -n the person of the importer can have no influence. It
is too obvious for controversy that they interfere equally
with the power to regulate commerce". " In his clear and well-
written opinion Marshall, Ch. J., spoke as follows concerning
a State's taxing powers:-I'le admit this power (of a State to
tax its own citizens) to be sacred; but cannot admit that
it may be used so as to obstruct the free course of a
power given to Congress. We cannot admit that it may
be used so as to obstruct or defeat the power to regulate
commerce. It has been observed that the powers remaining
with the States may be so exercised as to come in conflict
with those vested in Congress. When this happens, that
which is not supreme must yield to that which is supreme.
This great and universal truth is inseperable from the nature
of things and the Constitution has applied it to the often
interfering po;wers of the general and State governments as
a vital principle of perpetual operation. It results nec-
essarily, from the principle that the taxing rower of the
States must have some limitw. It cannot reach and re-
strain the action of the national government within its
proper sphere. Tt cannot reach the administration of jus-
tice in the courts of the Union, or the collection of taxes
14
of the United States, or restrain the )meration of any law
which Congress may, constitltionally pass. it cannot inter-
fere with any regulation of coymnerce.
The License Cases, 5 How. 504, decided that certain State
statutes equirin, licenses of liquor dealer.s were not reg-
ulations of commerce. The (liversity of reasons gove-ning
the justices are interesting but the opinions arechiefly
valuable in our present discussion because o:" the remarks
of some of the justices concerning the extent of the power
of Congress over commerce. TaneA, Oh.. J. said that the
"1mere grant of power to the general government cannot upon
any Just principles of construction be construed to be an
absolute prohibition to the exercise of any power over the
same slibject by the States." Woodbury J., said; "T'here is
nothing in its nature in sev al resrects to render it
more exclusive than other grants, but, on the contrary,
much in its nature to permit and require the concurrent
and auxiliary action of the States. But I admit, so far
as regar-s the uniformitv- of a regulation reaching to all
the States it must in these cases, of course, be exclusive;
-------- --. . .t there in much in connection
with foreign commerce which is local ,ithin each ±n~te,
15
convenient for its regulation an useful to the public, to
be acted on by each till the power is abused or some course
is taken by congress conflicting with it."
The Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, concerned the validity
of State laws requiring the mast c-rs of vessels engaged in
foreign commerce to pay a certain sum to a state officer on
account of every nassenger brought from a foreign country
into the State. The statutes were held by a divided court
(five to four) to be unconstitutional. he five just-i.ces
voting that the laws were anconstitutional some thought
that the power to regulate commerce was exclusively in Con-
gress while others thought that the case did not require
the court to pass on that question. Woodbury, J., said
that he did not think that Congress by remaining inactive
thereby virtually enacted that the States should do nothing
concerning; commerce.
This review of the case shows us that up to this time
the court had settled upon no definite rule by which to
measure the extent of the power o\eiLdommerce vested in Con-
gress or by which to determine when the States) endeavor-
ing to exercise only their own legitimate powers exceed ,
their authority and invadef the domain of Congress. As the
16
cases had arisen the court had dextrously avoided laying
down any definite rule drawing the line betv:eenfnatifona
and state authority. The single justices had expressed
different views but it was not until Cooleyv. The Board of
Wardens, 12 How. 299, decided in 1851, that any definite
rule was laid down by the court. This case arose concern-
ing the validity of laws of Pennsylvania regulating pilots
and pilotage. Curtis, J., delivered the opinion, from which
I quote at considerable length. "The diversities of
opinion therefore, which have existed on this subject, have
arisen from the different views taken of the naturie of this
power to regulate conmerce. But when the nature of a
power like this is spoken of, when itis said that the nature
of the power rcquires that it should be exercised exclu-
sively by Congress; it must be intended to refer to the
subjects of that power, and to say they are of such a nature
as to require exclnsive regulation by Congress. Now the
power to regulate commece embraces a vast field, containing
not only.manj but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike
in their nature;- some imrneratively demanding a single uni-
form rule operating equally on the commerce of the United
17
States in every part; and some, like tl-e subj' ct i'9'7 V"
question, as imperatively demandin:, that diversity, wlhich
alone can meet e 1oc,J necs lities of navigation.
"Either absolutel-T to affirmi o-. denr that the nature of
this power requires exclusive legislation by Congress, is
to lose s*ght of the uat'lre of the subjects of this power,
and to asset concerning all of them what is really ap-
plicable but to a part. Whatever subjects of this power
are in their nature national or admit only of one uniform
system, or plan of recognition, may justly be said to be of
such a nature to require exclusive legislation by Congress.
That" -this ' cannot be affirmed of laws for the regulation
of pilots and pilotage is plain. The act in-"'
1879 contains a clear and authorative declaration by the
first Congress, that the nature of this subject is such
that until Congress should find it necessary to exert its
power, it should be left to the legislation of the States;
that it is local and not national; that it is likely to
be .,.rovided for not byr one system or plan of regulations,
but by as many as the legislative discretion of the several
States should deem applicable to the local peculiarities
of the ports within its limits."
The distinctions made in this decision have since been
generally recon e and the case "to)' has become an
authority. The case held in effect that the States may
enact valid inspection laws, quarantine laws, pilotage laws
etc., laws concerning matters of local importance, and ad-
mitting of local legislation, even though they incident-
ally affect interstate commerce, until Congress itself shall
legislate upon the matter. This has often been approved.
Henderson v. The Mayor, 92 U. S. 259; Sherlock v. Alling,
93 U. S. 90; Hall v. De Cuir 95 U. S. 485, 488; Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co.
2 Pet. 250, Gilman v. Philidelphia 3 Vall. 713.
As to those commercial relations which by their nature
demand one uniform syTstem of regulatior hroughout! the
whole extent of the country it was for a long time un-
certain whether the States could legislate when Con-
gress had done nothil-g but it *as tte Anl Welten 7rL ,:
v. Missouri, 9l U. S. 275, that the silence of Congres
is tantamount to a ceclaration ti-at such commerce shall
be unrestraineo, so that vhether Congress has acte( or not
the State cannot legislate concerning this class of inter-
19
state commerce. Brown v. Houston 114 U. S. f 7,; alling v.
Michigen 116 U. S. 446; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District
120 U. S. 489; Railroad Co. v. Husen 95 U. S. 4(5;.
CFAPT7,- III.
Corporations Engaged in Commerce VToll- 1Tithin a -State.
0 0- - - - -
Now that we have examined the Constitutional limitations
of State authority over inter-state commerce, let us turn our
attentions to corpors-tions that we ma,r see v.,hat they are
and to what extent they are subject to State control.
A corp,,ration is a c-reature of the law which has perpetual
succespion and which is distinct from the rersons composing
it who as members have no authority to bind the corporation
and who are not personallyT bound b, the corporation's
liabilities. In the Dartmouth College Case MTarshall Ch.
J., characterizeO a corporation as "an artificral being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only.- In cOntr-nmilation
of law." Inasruch as they come into existence only by vir-
tue of creating statutes, the scope of their authority is
only such as these statutes give them and they are subject
to such liabilities and limitations as the statutes impose.
Pyl accepting their charters the, 'c ccome subject to the im-
posed conditions but it was heldf in the DErntmouth College
21
Case (4 Wheat. 518) that a charter reserving to the State
no power to make future changes was a nontract between the
State and the corporation, which the State could not there-
after change because of the Constitutional provision for-
bidding States to pass any law impairing the obligation of
contracts. Some of our best legal thinkers are beginning
to doubt the correctness of this decision but it is now the
accepted laV7 . Since this decision was rendered the States,
when granting corporate existence, have for the most part
reserved to themselves the right to alter corporation charters
at will, so that now corporations are at the mercy of their
creating States and their very existence hangs on the
mere caprice of the State legislatures.
Many corporations extend teir operations outr'id' the
States of their creation irto other States of the Tnion, and
when in States other than that of their creation they F: e
callecd "foreign" corporations. The chart'rs of coroorations,
like other State legislation, have no extra-territorial effect.
Their operation is necessarily confined to the jurisdiction of
the States granting them. Consequently we must examine the
status of thosr corporations h-ich, created by one State, desire
to exercise their correrate franchise in other jurisdictions.
In prosecuting this inquiry, however, let us for the rresent
PP
carefully exclude from our investirtion all corporations
reartiallly Cr vtolly eng ageC in irtC,-state commerce.
It was decidrA in >an: of Augupta v. Earl, 13 Pet. 510
and Paul v. Virg1-Aa, 8 7 a11. l 8, both of w0ch hve often
been followeC (nff approved, that a corporation has no in-
herent rig:ht to exercise, its corrorste functions in ary
,state otlher thar tPat of its creation. It ce-rot migrate
from one S:tate to anoth-,er, at ,,ill, for, when it passes the
boundaries of its ow:n State, its riFiht to be recognizec.
in its oorpo ate capacity ceases. Other States may ab-
solutely refuse to admit it. It cannot cleim admisoion
unde- that clause of the Constitution Eiiaranteeing that"the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the priv-
ileges and immunities of citizens of the several States"
because a corporation Is not a"citize2i'within its meaning.
As Field, J., scmid in Paul v. Virr:inia, "The term citizens
as thfo u.sed applies only to natural persons, members of
the body politic, owing allegiance to the State, not to arti-
ficial persons created by the legislature, and rossessinr
only the attributes w.hich the legislature has prescribed."
The States may refuse to admit foreign corporations al-
together or they may, recognize afd receive them uron their
compliance with certain imposed conditions. The nature of
the conditions is entirely within the discretion of the
legislatures of the States and consequently we find in the
State statutesenacted regarding the admission of foreign
corporations, many manifestations of the short-sightedness,
cupidityand and selfishness of mankind. It is not unusual
for these statutes to discriminate against foreign cor-
porations in favor of domestic corporations by imposing fsex _
tortionate and oppressive conditions uipon foreign corpo-
rations seeking admission but the foreign corporations are
powerless to object. They must either remain without or
submit to the burdens inflicted upon them. Bank of
Augusta v- Earl, 13 Pet. 586; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168;
Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410; People v. Philadelphia Fire
Ins. Co. 92 N. Y. 311, ditto ; 119 U. S. 110; Pembina
Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania 12 U. S. 181;Home Ins. Co. v.
New York 134 U. S. 594.
However there is one limitation upon the rapacious greed
of the States. They cannot require as a ,ondition prec-
edent to admission that the foreign corporations agree to
give up their constitutional right to remove litigation from
the State courts to Federal courts. 7he courts will not
24
allow a corp,)ati :n to contract away its constitutional priv-
ileges. Such an agrenment is 2ontrary to public Tolicy.
0onsequently State statutes requiring such concessions have
been held void and agreements made under them -i !-e nullities.
Home Insurance Co. v. Morse 20 Wall. 445; Btrnon v. Burnside
121 U. S. 186.
While holding in mind that States may absolutely prohibit
the entrance of foreign corporations or may permit their en-
trance upon presczribed conditions, we must not lose sight of
the fact that foreign corporations may and frequently Oo
enter Ttates which have no statute concerning foreign cor-
porations. 7his is by reason of' :omity among the States.
In harmony with the E&eneral law of comit3i obtaining among
States composing the Union, the presumption should be in-
dulged that the corporations of one State, not forbidden
by the laws of its own being, may exercise within any other
State the general powers conferred by its own charter, un-
less it is prohibited from so doing, either in the direct
enactments of the latter State, or by its public policy, to
be deduced from the general course of legislation or f-.om
t11e settled adjudications of its highest courts." Chriptian
Union v. Yount 101 U. S, 352.
P~ 5
The practical results of the holding that a cor-
poration is not a"citizen" within the meaning of that clause
of the Constitution securing the citizens of each State the
privilege and immunities of citizens of the several States
are not conductive to harmonious feeling between the States
and to the best interests of the reople at large. In-
fluenced by the example of the national government en-
deavoring to advance the interests of its people by pro-
tective tariffs, it is only natural that the States attempt
to foster their own corporations by discriminating against
foreign oorporations doing business within their borders.
The domestic corporations themselves may thereby be ben-
efited but it is questionable whether the interests of the
people of the States are advanced by this lessening of
competition. The politicians and pseudo-statesmen fail to
recognize that the best interests of the S 'ate are served
not by repelling but rather by attracting capital and bus-
iness enterprises.
Another result of the unlimited power of the States over
foreign corporations is that thisrclass of corpora.tions are
severely taxed in some of the States. There is a growing
tendency throughout the Union to increase the burdens im-
posed upon all eorporations. Nothing at the present time
more occupies the minds of State legislators than the prob-
lem of raising revenue for State purposes. Within the past
few years many of the States have revised or modified to a
considerable extent their tax laws. -In several States
there are now progressing thorouh investigations of ex-
isting systems of taxation and thoughtful discussions of rro-
posed methods of increasing the State revenues and, -f ar rs
possible, equalizing the burdens of taxation. Many in-
novations have already been introduced. The tendency seems
to be for the States to decrease and in some cases Awholly
abolish direct taxation for -,tate purposes and to meet the
increasing demands on the State treasuries by raising the
rate and multiplying the sources of indirect taxation.
The political reasons for this are good and the economical
reasons are sound.
As the legislators look around for that whiclk they may
tax, their eyes soon fall upon corporations. Not only are
the legislat arB much influenced by the popular prejudices
against corporations but they themselves are biased in their
own ideas. They look upon all corporations as money making
organizations, which have received without recompense val-
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uable franchises from the Stat' fbY; 1hi2Ah they,. hcId bejmade
to pay dearly. They seem to t'lnk that somehow the cor-
porations have acquired inexhaustable funds from which the
State may draw at will, apparently forgetting that a cor-
poration is merely "a collective and changing body of men"
to which has been given "the character and properties of
individuality" and that in its individual capacity it is
governed by men being by no means devoid of human frailty
and weakness.'
CThe conditions of society and the modes of doing business
in this country are such that a large part of its trand-
actions are conducted through the agency of corporations.
This is especially true with regard to the business of
banking, insurance, and transportation. Individuals cannot
safely engage in enterprises of this sorti requiring large
capital. They can only be successfully carried out by
corporations in which individuals may safely join their small
contributions without endangering their entire fortunes."
To unjustly tax and increase the burdens of these organiz.
tions is to oppress investors, discourage enterprise, and
thereby abridge the possibilities of tlirvgi'L humanity
and curtail the opportunities for increasing the happiness
of mankind.
While recognizing the dangerous tendency of the present
prejudice against corporations and of the growing ten-
dency to increase the taxes upon corporations, we must not
forget that cortorate franchises are valuable concessions
from the State and privileges for which they ought to
give compensation. They, like private citizens, should
help bear the burdens of State but in the attempt to lighten
the burdens of private citizens, corporations ought hot'to be
unjustly burdened.
When to this disposition to heavily tax all corporations
we add thp.t selfishnesf' of men which makes them desire that
others' bear their I burdens, we can understand why
States are so desirou,. of subjecting foreign corporations
to such heavy taxes. By this means a, State- may raise
a large revenue from the citizens of oher States and at the
same time protect its own corpotations from too severe com-
petition. As we have already shown, the foreign cor-
poration is recognized only by reason of the comity among
the States and each State may impose as conditions pre-
cedent any burdens which it may desire. Paul v. Virginia
8 Wall. 168. Even after the corooation hls been ad-
mitted on reasonable conditions, it is not secure for even
29
then the State may revoke its consent and expel the cor-
poration or it may impose new and more burdensome conditions,
People v. Fire Association of Philadelphia, 92 N. Y. 311, do.
119 U. S. 110.
We have seen that there is one condition precedent which
a State cannot impose, viz., that a foreign c )rooration
agree as the orice of admission not to remove its causes
from the State to the Federal courts; but although the
3tate cannot require this agreement as a condition prec-
edent, it may expel from its jurisdiction any foreign cor-
poration exercising this privilege. This is somewhat in-
congruous but such is the holding of Doyle v. Continental
Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535.
This unjust discrimination to which foreign cor-
porations are subjected is possible because of the holding
of Bank of Augusta v. Earle (13 Pet. 586) and Paul v.
Virginia, (8 71all. 168); that a corporation is n ot a
"citizen" The nosition taken seems to have resulted from
a fear that) if foreign corporations were allowed to exercise
their peculiar -rivileges within a State, the oeoole
thereof might be cheated and defrauded by these stran,-e,
elusive creatures, called corporations, which would in some
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mysterious manner sudcdnly vanish thereb'r escaping all their
liabilities. Of late years the Deoole are losing some of
their pejudice acainst cornorations -7nc are beginning to
underq'tand more fully the rights an- liabilitie of cor-
porations and to realize that, instead of being rapacious
monsters in disguise, the-r are merely combinations of
human beings. As a result off Lhese decisions there thas
arisen an internecine warfare among the States eo that
some -.ctuateO by narrow, selfish motives t] y to favor
their citizens and corporations at the expense o- those
citizens of other States who have formed themselves into
corporations. Such a ciisposition is contrary to that broad
harmonious snirit which our forefathers tried to inculcate
on this nation. It las to prevent th artaonnizing of the
irterests of the States and of the people that the Consti-
tution was formed, after the people had had a most bitter
experience under the Articles of Confederation1 durlng which
ime the hostile interests of the States had well nigh
caused the risruption of the Union. Surely the framers of
the Constitution would have favored no such discriminations
as have been practiced since Paul v. 7irginia.
Many of our best lawyers believe that "the fiction of the
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le,-al person has outlived its use ulness aud it is no long-
er adequate for ';he purpose of an accurate treatment of the
legal relations arising through the orosecution of a cor-
porate enterprise." ?o °morations are becoming to be re-
garded more as partnerships with peculiar powers and
liabilities. T ut be this as it mayt, it is probablr too
late to look for any changes in the holding as to the cit-
izenehlp of corporations. he present theory has been fol-
lowed too long but it would be more in keeping with the
harmony of our institutions and with the spirit of the
Constitution, if corporationrv were regarded as citizens of
their respective States and as such were allowed the same
privileges and nlaced under the same restrictions, in each
State as are domestic corporations. ''o protect its
private citizens each State ought to have a system of rigid
examination and strict regulation applicable to foreign
and domestic corporations alike. Thus would its citizens
be fully protected and justice allotted to all.
Although we may expect no change in the law as to the
citizenship of corporations, there i. in the decisions a
noticeable tendency to take a broader view as to the
status of foreign corporations. Field, J., in delivering
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the opinion of the court in Paul v. Virginia, said;--It
has been held that ,:here contracts or rights of property are
to be enforced by or against corporations, the courts of
the United States will, for the purpose of maintaining
jurisdictior, consider the corporation as representing cit-
izens of the State under the laws of which it is created,
and to this extent will treat a corporation as a citizen_
within the clause of the Constitution extending the Judi-
cial power of the United States to controversies between cit-
izens of Cifferent States. In the early cases when the
question of the right of corporations to litigate in the
courts of the United States was considered, it was held that
the right depended upon the citizenship of the members of
the corporation, and its proper averment in the pleadings.
Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cranch 57. In later cases this
ruling was modified and it was held that the rnembers of a
corporation woulO be nresumed to be citizens of the State in
which the corporation was created and where alone it had any
legal existence, without any special averment of such cit-
izenship, the averment of the place of creation and business
of the corporation being sufficient; and that such rre-
suption could not be controverte! for the purose of defeat
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ing the jurisdiction of t-e co'-rt." Louisville Pailrosc
CO. v. Letson, 2 How. 497; Marshall v. Faltimore and Ohio
P ailroad Co., 1C Vow. 314; Covington Drawbridge Co. v
Shephsrc, 0 hc7. [',; Ohio and is1ii -ailroad v.
vlheeler, 1 Elack 7e, r07; r'teamshir Co. v. Tu7man 106
U. S. 118. So wp see tiat the term "citizen" is differentl--
interpreted in cdiffe-rent narts of the Constitution; whlile
it held to include corpbratiors so as to extend thr juris-A
diction of the United States Courts, it is held not to in-
clvc corporations so as to rrctect them from uinjulst dis-
crimination Ly the several States. V-.e find another indi-
cation of the present liberality of the couirts towaprd cor-
porations in the construction Put uron the term "person" as
useC in the Fourternth Amendment. This is hold to include
corporations as well as ratural persons. Santa Clara County
v. Southern Pacific 118 U. S. 394; Pembina Silver MIninF
Co. v. Pennsylvania 125 U. S. 181; Pome Tnsurance Co. v.
New York 134 U. S. 594; C. C. & A. Tailroad v. Gibbes
14£ TT. S. 386.
CI AP TP.. I' ,
Corporations Enfaged in Inter-state Cormercr.
-0 - - - - -
Vhe havc examined the causes which effected the rgranting
to Congress of the power to regulate inter-state commerce and
we have studied those decisions of the United States Supreme
Court which defie the extent of this power and point out
th __.. .it. { , :: piace. upon' _Lje power of - Stu , .
that there are two claSses of inter-state commerce, con
cerning one of which the ,C.tates may legislate until Con-
gress acts but concerning the other of which the States may
take no action even though Cong:ress remain silcnt; we have
also considered the ,taus of corporatirs both domestic and
foreign, which are rngaged in business wholly within a State.
Let 'us now d nvestigste the right of a State to tax the bus-
iness and the franchise of corporations engaged i.n inte: -
state commere. For tl.-hE purprrer of Gi-,r investigation let
us take. railroacz corporations, fecr, whilc tThe princiries in-
volvecd apply to them equaly vith all ct'er corporations
the nature Of thcir L.; sinesr is such tht-t tlere 4- ruch
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confusion and, if we are able to determine the relations ex-
isting between the States and railroad corporations, we
shall have arrived at an understanding of the right of a
State to tax the business and franchises of all corporations
engaged in interstate cormerce.
Without entering into a discussion of the term "franchise"
we may interpret it as meaning the right of a corporation to
act in its corporate capacity. The business of railroad
corporations is the transmission of freight and passengers
from place to place which is within the accepted defini-
tions of the term "commerce". Since the lines of many of
these corporations extend into two or more States, their
business may be divided under two heads the first being the
transportation of freight and passengers between tWo points
within the same State; the second being inter-state com-
merce, which includes the transportation of freight and
passengers from a point within the State to a point without,
or from a point without the State to a-punt within, or
from one point without the Stb.te to another point without
the State by a route passing through the State.
Concerning commerce wholly within any one State Congress
no action. It has
can take.no powers other than those conferred upon it by the
Constitution and the power to regulate 611- < . en
is not so conferred. This power it 4therefore, retained by
the States and commerce within a State is subject to such reg-
ulations as such State may decree. Therefore the business
of transporting freight and passengers between points
within a State's boundaries is liable to taxation just as
is any other form of business.. If the States permit it
to be conducted by corporations, these corporations must
comply with such requirements as the States shall make.
If the corporations be domestic, the States make their demands
and requirements a part of the charters which the corporatior
must accept in order to gain a legal existence. The
franchise granted are often of great value and it is em-
inently just that they be subjected to taxation and made
to bear some of the burdens of government. The right of the
State to tax these franchises is unquestionable.
If the corporations be foreign they can gain admission and
recognition in their legal capacity only by complying wit
such conditions as the States may impose.
A nice distinction is drawn in New York between the
power of the States to tax the "business" and its rower to
tax the "franchises"of foreign corporations. The distinct-
ion arose under a statute requiring every corporation
doing business in the State to pay a tax, as a tax upon its
corporate franchise or business". It is said that the
franchises of foreign corporations, being dependant on the
laws of the States of their creation and having no existence
seperate therefrom, cannot be taxed. The franchises of
a corporation exist only at its place of domicile or res-
idence. However the business of foreign corporations may
be taxed like any other business within the State.
This doubtful distinction between the franchises and bus-
iness of foreign corporations was drawn in People v.
Equitable Trust Co., 96 N. Y. 387, 389 and approved In the
recent case of People v. Wemple 33 N. E. 720. While it -
is true that foreign corporations first gain existence be-
cause of franchises granted by one State, is it not equally
true that other States by throwing open their doors to these
foreign corrorations and ty receiving and recognizing them
in their corporate capacity thereby grant to them certain
privileges in the nature of a franchise. But this dis-
tinction does not obtain everywhere. The Maine statute
which was brought in question in State of Maine v. Grand
Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217, enacted that every corporation
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person, or association operatinf- E railroad in the State
shoulCl pay "an annual excise tax for iJe privilere of ex-
ercising its franchis," in the ntate 7ield, J., ir de-
livering the orinion of the court sAi, privilepe
cf exernisins the franchies of eorporation irithin a State isA
one of value - -.--- -- --. As the rrantinF of the
privilege rests entirel- in the rCIsretion of the State
whether the corporation be of domestic of foreign origin,
etc. etc." thus showing that the learne judge thought that
a foreign corporation on 'eirg allowed to enter a State
receives valuable franchise from that State and the reason-
ing of the case is that such franchises may be taxed..
-, t howrver this may be, whether a State rominates that
which it taxes as the -franchise or as the bilsiness, it is
certain that a ,tate may sub.Ject to taxation all foreign
corporations conducting commerce wholly within its
limits w,,ithovt let or h lnrance.
Pailroarl cortorations not only , or Cuct such commerce as
is wholly within a State but they} [,lso engagpe in inter-
state commerce. It is well setled tat the States cannot
tax the business of conducting inter-state commerce. ro tax
the business itself is to regulate it and the courts havr, -a
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time again hcld that insiduous attempts to regulate inter-
state commerce by means of taxes craftily levied on the
business awe contrary to the fundamental law: of the land.
Frequent attempts have also been htade to exact license fees
from those engaged in interstate commerce but the courts
have held that the States may impose no conditions upon
are6 make no exactions from those pursuing this c alling.
Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; Lyng
v. Michigan 135 U. S. 161; McCall v. California 136 U. S.
104; Norfolk & Western P. F. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136
U. S. 114, Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47. The req-
uisition of such a license fee is in reality the ira-
position of a tax on the business itself, which is beyond
the power of the State.
Failure to raise revenue in this way has induced a dis-
position to exact contribution from corporations both
domestic and foreign, which are engaged in inter-state com-
merce on the pretext that they have received from the State
and are exercising valuable franchises. Unquestionably the
power to regulate inter-state commerce rEsides in Congress
and in the exercise of itF powers dongress may avail its-
self of whatever means it deems fit. This is by reason of
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the last clause of Sect. 8, Art. lof-eoonstitution which
provides that Congress shall have pcwer "to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into ex-
ecution the foregoing powers." The power to create cor-
porations is among the implied powers of Congress. This
power was first exercised in creatinF the United States
Bank and the validity of the act was established by
1,'c Cullough v. Maryland, 4 7heat. 316. Pursuant to this
implied power Congress may create corporations to con-
duct the inter-state transportation of the country and in
some cases it has acted upon this authority; e. g. in
incorporating the Union Pacific Railroad Company.
Shoilld Congress in the exercise of its power to regulate
inter-state commerce provide that all inter-state trans-
portation should be conducted Iy corporations created by
itself, ce:tainly the franchises so granted could not be
taxed by the States. (Mc Culloch v. Maryland 4 T heat. 31r)
Ch. J. Marshall said: "All subjects over v'rhich the sov-
ereign rower of a State el:tends are ob.ects of ta;.cstion;
but those over vzhich it Coes not extend, are, uron the
soundest principles exempt from taxation." Franchises
granted by Co ress are unquestionably outside the sovereign
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power of the :tater and therefore not subject to State
taxation.
.ut Congress has not exercisrci ite power in this way.
Py remainint silent on thie subect of inter-state commerce,
Congress virtuallT sals that the natural citizens of the
States are free to engage in inter-state commerce and that
the corporations existing by7 virtue of State franchises may
also participate. Those corporations already have a lpgel
existence within the State for the purposes of cvmmerce
whollW within the State are adopted by Congress and given
the privilege of embarking in inter-state commerce. Con-
gress has not yet found it necessary, except in a few
isolated cases.,to create corporations for the purpose of
inter-state transportation. It has been satisfied to take
corporations, which are under State supervision, and confer
upon them without restriction the right to embark in this
business. State corporations satisfy rll its requirements.
Can it be said that in an, wa these cornorations derive their
right to engage in inter-state tramnsortation from the
States? Most certainly not. TheJfranchises are
from the general government and beirg granted by Congress
the States cannot properly tax them. Cbrporations are
4 P
among the means and instruments adopted b y Congresv with
which to exercise its power of regulating inter-state
coi rerce and the States may not imoair their effect-
iveness or curtail their usefulness by burdening them
with taxes. The States may not exact license fees
from those ebout to engage in inter-state commerce; why
should they be allowed to usurp the power of Congress by
limiting the legal capacity in which those engaged in
inter-state commerce may act? Pensacola Tel. Co. v.
West. Union 96 U. S. 1; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Penn-
sylvania 122 U. S. 326; Norfolk & W1estern R. P. Co. v.
Pennsylvania 136 U. S. 114.
Of what use would be this power Of Congress were the
States oermitted to tax either the business of inter-
state commerce itself or the instruments which Congress
uses to effectuate its purposes? Chief Justice Marshall
said that the rower to tax involved the power to destroy.
They may continue to'tax an object until it is taxed out of
existence. To give Congress the power to regulate inter-
state commerce while leaving in the States the power to
practically nullify the acts and wishes of Congress is
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contrary to the fundamental theory of our Constitution.
As was well said by John Marshall, that creet interrreter
of the Constitution there is "e principle which ro entirely
pervades the Constitution, is so intErmixed with the
materiald which compose it, so interwoven with its web, so
blended with its texture, as to be incapable of beinFg sep-
arated from it vithodt rending it to shreds. This great
principle is, that the Constitution and laws made in pur-
suance thereof are supreme; that they control the Consti-
tution and laws of the respective States, and cannot be con-
trolled by them. From this which may almost be termed an
axiom, other propositions are deduced as corolaries. These
are, 1. That a power to create implies a power to pre-
serve. 2. rhat a power to destroyif wielded by a r!1fferent
hand iSho ile to lanyd Incompatible with the-powOtto §2
preserve. 3. That where this repugnancy exists, thet
authority which is supreme must control, not yield, to that
over which it is supreme-"
In.December 1891, the case of State of M .Taine v. Grand
Trunk Ry. Co., rerorted in 142 U. S.,came before the United
States Supreme Court for review. The cuestion concerned the
validity of taxes levied upon the defendant corporation,
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under a Maine statute requiring every corporation, person,
or association operating a railroad in the State to pay to
the Stvfe Treasurer an annual excise tax for the privilege
of exercising its franchises in the State." The amount of
this annual excise tax was ascertained by a reference to,
and"=" with the average gross transiprtAtion receipts
per ne~. wh hn the State was ascertained by aividd gL_
the gross transportation receipts of such railroad for its
whole length by the total zkmber of miles. The court be-
low held that the imposition of the tax was a regulation
of commerce, inter-state and foreign, and therefore in con-
flict with the exclusive power of Congress in this respect.
The Supreme Court, four of the learned justices dissenting,
reversed the decision of the lower court and upheld the
Maine Statute.
Mr. Justice Field, delive-ing the opinion of the Cou~t
said:--"The tax for the collection of which this action is
brought, is an excise tax upon the defendant corporation
for the privilege of exercising its franchises within the
State of" Maine. It is so deciared1 in the statute which
imposes it; and that a tax of this character is within the
power of the State to levy. there can be no question."
7hus the court e1 the questions conceir-ing the right
of a State to tax the franchises of railroads conducting
both commerce wholly within a State and commerce between
the States. No 6istinction was drawn between the privileges
which corrorations are granted by the States and the rights
receiveC from the general government, but there certainly
does exist a vast difference between the powers of a State
over these two classes of franchises. One infers from
the language of Mr. 6-astice Field that the court looked l'
upon all of the franchises exercised by the corporation
within the State of Maine as having bern received from ti.t
State; but such a position is not tenable. It would r.At-
urally follow from such a position that the State may de-
termine the amount which it will exact fcr the privilege
of exercising these franchises by a reference to the gross
receipts devised from both classes of commerce. If on the
other hand a State may tax only franchises which are Franted
by itself ard if such franchises confer onlr the right
to conduct commerce ,,.rholly within the State, it is
difficult to see how the State is justified in estimating
the value of the privilege thut! T" rtecd b" rerring to
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the receipts from inter-state commnerce. T,, 1-osition of the nt
lrity- of- the. coUrt, seems -incicale, viz., that wrhile the
t -\ irn el .estion was call(6 - "tax for the privileue of
exercising its franchises in tho State, it war in reality
" t r-on the receipts of the company deri-rC from inter-
state transportation" and therefore unconstitutional.
It has been argued from the Grand Trunk dase that a
foreign corporation, even though engaged in inter-state
commerce, is entirely at the mercy of a State. Three
propositions were deduced from the holdinr, in that case,
vizi- (1). Then a corporation engaged in inter-state
commerce applies for admision to a State, that State may_
refuse its request; but if the State does admit such for-
eign corporation it ma t-x it for exercising its franchises
within the Statef(,) ,,hether it is engaged in inter-
state commerce only or (3) or it is engaged in 'both classes
of commerce. The 1c.arl proposition was established by the
Grand Trunk Case but the conclusion there reached is not
sustained by the line of reasoning we have followec. "he
authority of the case is weakened by- the fact that the
second proposition, ihich is suported by a parity of reason-
ing has failed to teceive the sanction of the "Jew York
Court of Appeals. The S"tate of TYew -York attermPed to tax
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the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. under ste.tute requiring
Itevery corporation organized under the lawus of any other
State and Cdoing business in this State" to ray an annual tax;f
#(as a tax upon its coruorate franchise or business." The
sole business of the coJoorction in the State of New York
consisted of landing passengers anc1 freight brought from
other States and receiving passengers and freight for
transportation to other States; that is to say it consisted
entirely of inter-state commerce. The same line of reason-
ing which upheld the validity of the tax upon the Grand
Trunk Railway Co. would have approved the tax levied upon
the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. but instead of approving and
following the decision of the United States Supreme Court
the New York Court of Appeals distinguished State of Maine
v. Grand Trunk fly. Co., 142 U. S. 217, and held that a State
having once admitted a foreign corporation could not tax its
business or franchises when engaged solely in inter-state
commerce, People v. Wemple 33 N. E. 720, decided in April,
1893.
The first proposition that a State may refuse to admit
a foreign corporation engaged in inter-state commerce was not
material to the issue in People v. V'!emole and was not there
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discussed. The logical position is that a State may not ex-
clude such a corporation. If Congress virtually adopts
the corporations existing in the States and thereby author-
izes them to engage in inter-state commeree, ,he several
States may not nullif',11 , the vJll of Congress by• excluding such
corporations from their juric'ieijons.
But foreign corporations Iaving thus gained admission to
a State for the purpose of inter-obthte commerce do not there-
by acr-uire a right to enrz:;r in :o. rr-rrcr as is wholly
within that State. This right can only be obtained from the
State itself. But f .equently the mere right to engage in
inter-state commerce in the several States, which the
corporations of any one of the States gain from Congress, is
not sufficient to place such corporations in a position to
engage in such business, as for example railroad corporations.
In order to engage in inter-state commerce in the ordinary
course of their business they must acquire a right of way
into a State so that they may lay their tracks. The
passiveness of Congress does not enable them to exercise
the right of eminent domain within a State and it is prob-
able than Only-In the most exceptional cases will Congress
take active measures to secure this right to railroad cor-
porations; so that, although these corporations may have a
naked right to engage in inter-state commerce within the sev-
eral States of the Tnion, they are enabled to exercise this
right only by means of State statutes permitting them to ex-
ercise the right of eminent domain and condemn rights of way.
Although the States may not deny the right of railroad cor-
porations to enter and engage in inter-state commerce, the
States may, by their passiveness, prevent such corporations
from acquiring the means whereby they may exercise such'
right.

